President Javier Milei emerged from Argentina’s October 2025 midterms with more congressional allies and an agenda extending well beyond defending his vetoes. By early November, his government was preparing a 2026 budget, tax simplification and changes to labour rules, while placing a possible pension overhaul farther down the sequence. The Buenos Aires Times reported that Milei had invited governors and other political forces to discuss a second reform wave. The distinction between an announced priority and a bill enacted into law mattered: none of these proposed overhauls had cleared the new Congress at that point.

The budget was the first gate. The state had been operating with extensions of the 2023 spending plan, so negotiating a 2026 framework could restore regular legislative control over annual expenditure. The October result strengthened Milei’s bloc but did not hand it a majority in either chamber. The Times reported that officials expected the new lower house to have around 100 libertarian deputies out of 257, with a larger coalition possible through cooperation with PRO. Those were early estimates, not a guarantee of votes for each bill. Provincial governors, whose delegations can determine close decisions, therefore retained leverage.

Tax reform without breaking the budget

Milei argued for reducing the cost of formal employment and simplifying the tax system. The Times reported that he wanted to lower employer payroll taxes and eliminate or reduce a number of taxes, with the stated aim of broadening the base and discouraging evasion. The economic proposition was that cheaper compliance would move workers and businesses onto the books and, eventually, support more private investment. The fiscal question was how to offset lost revenue before those hoped-for gains materialized. The president’s insistence on balance meant large tax cuts would have to be sequenced, financed or made contingent on greater collections elsewhere.

The Buenos Aires Herald reported that the administration’s 2026 budget proposal forecast 5% economic growth and 10.1% inflation for the next year. These were government projections in a bill, not independently measured outcomes. Economists and governors would need to test whether those assumptions left adequate resources for spending obligations. A legislative victory on paper would mean less if the macroeconomic forecasts proved optimistic and the treasury had to revise appropriations later.

Labour rules and the union fault line

The government said greater flexibility would reduce informal work and employment disputes. The Herald reported that officials were drafting provisions to allow more company-level or regional wage bargaining rather than relying exclusively on national sectoral agreements. Employers could see that as a way to adjust conditions to their size and local market; unions saw the same change as a weakening of collective bargaining power. The Buenos Aires Times reported employer support for structural changes and categorical union opposition to proposals circulating after the election. Drafts and political proposals were not yet a single settled legislative text.

Pensions were another politically charged area. Milei had vetoed an opposition pension increase and a contribution moratorium earlier in 2025. The Times reported that he had spoken of an eventual pension-system overhaul but supplied no detailed proposal. The Herald said a congressional source expected a pension reform only later, possibly beyond the current term. Those accounts did not describe a pension bill moving alongside the budget. They revealed a strategic calculation: altering employment law first might bring more contributors into the system, while immediate pension cuts could trigger heavy resistance from retirees and opposition lawmakers.

The new interior minister, Diego Santilli, had been tasked with negotiating with governors and legislators. Their answer would decide whether Milei’s enlarged minority became a governing coalition. The months ahead would test tax arithmetic, the political resilience of workers’ protections and the government’s ability to turn election-night strength into specific laws. A second reform wave had a roadmap; it did not yet have passage.